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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effect of the gender of local policymakers on policy outcomes.
Analyzing a rich dataset from Brazilian municipalities and using a regression discon-
tinuity design, we find that municipalities ruled by female mayors have better health
outcomes, receive more federal discretionary transfers, and have lower corruption. Addi-
tionally, male mayors hire more temporary public employees than their female counter-
parts when they are allowed to run for re-election, and when municipal elections are
approaching. These findings suggest that male mayors may promote more political pa-
tronage than female mayors and that men and women may respond differently to local
election incentives.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, a great deal of attention has been focused on the role of women as policymak-
ers.1 Several empirical studies find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the gender
of the policymaker affects policy decisions and outcomes (among others, Chattopadhyay
and Duflo (2004), Rehavi (2007), Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras
(2012), Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012)).2 In this paper, we provide new evidence on the
link between the gender of the policymaker and several policy outcomes at the municipal
level and highlight how local election incentives might affect gender differences, by analyzing
close elections between male and female candidates for mayor in Brazilian municipalities.
The empirical literature has analyzed the effect of the gender of the policymaker using two
alternative institutional settings. One set of papers focuses on female politicians elected as
a result of policies that establish minimum quotas of political positions reserved for women.
The other one focuses on open contested elections between candidates of different genders.
The seminal contribution of Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) finds that the reservation of
political positions for women in India affects the types of public goods provided. Beaman et
al. (2009) argue that prior exposure to a female chief councilor elected because of a quota
affects female attitudes and the gender composition of the future political leaders.3 Several
papers that analyze settings without quotas also find that the gender of the politician matters
(among others, Rehavi (2007); Ferreira and Gyourko (2011); Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras
(2012)). A key difference between elections with quotas and without is that in the latter
there is competition across genders. This distinction may be relevant, as the experimental
literature suggests that women may perform differently when competing against men than
when competing against other women (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), Gneezy and
Rustichini (2004)).
1A broader related literature analyzes women’s empowerment and economic development, see Doepke,
Tertilt and Voena (2011) and Duflo (2011) for recent reviews.
2A family of theoretical models that would be consistent with gender differences in policies would be
one in which male and female politicians have different policy preferences (Alesina, 1988). For instance, the
experimental literature finds evidence that, under some circumstances, the choices women make are more
socially oriented than men’s (see, for instance, Nowell and Tinkler (1994), Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001),
Eckel and Grossman (2008)).
3See also Fre´chette, Maniquet and Morelli (2008), De Paola, Scoppa and Lombardo (2010), Pande and
Ford (2011) and Besley et al. (2012) for analyses of the effects of introducing gender quotas in different
settings.
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In this paper, we contribute to this literature by highlighting how local election incentives
may affect gender differences in policy decisions and outcomes in a competitive environment.
Local elections can increase accountability, helping to align politicians’ actions to voters’
preferences, but may also generate incentives for politicians to behave strategically.4 The
effect of local elections on the behavior of politicians may differ across genders if men and
women respond differently to electoral incentives. A number of studies find evidence consis-
tent with this possibility. For instance, several papers have shown that men are more willing
to self-select into competitive environments than women and that their performance is more
sensitive to the level of incentives provided (Gneezy, Niederle and Rustichini (2003), Niederle
and Vesterlund (2007), Nierdele and Yestrumskas (2008), Dohmen and Falk (2011), Attali,
Neeman and Schlosser (2010)). However, most of this evidence is from experimental settings
and it is not clear whether gender differences found in the lab persist in the political arena.
We use a rich micro dataset of municipalities in Brazil to analyze whether the gender
of the policymaker affects policy outcomes and whether local election incentives play a role
in explaining gender differences. In order to control for municipality-specific confounding
factors we adopt a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design in close electoral races.5 In this
set-up, identification comes from comparing municipalities where a female candidate barely
won an election against a male candidate with municipalities where the opposite occurred.
We focus on outcomes that depend on the effort of the local government and for which
administrative data at the municipal level are available. First, we look at discretionary
infrastructure transfers from the federal government because the effort of the mayor is an
important determinant of the amount of transfers that municipalities receive in Brazil.6
Second, we analyze health outcomes, focusing in particular on health care services related
4Consistent with this idea, a growing empirical literature shows that electoral incentives may affect the
performance of local politicians. Besley and Case (1995) and List and Sturm (2006) provide evidence that
electoral incentives influence fiscal and environmental policies of U.S. governors. Foster and Rosenzweig
(2004) show that electoral competition affects the provision of public goods in Indian villages. In the case
of Brazil, the empirical evidence shows that term limits in mayoral elections affect corruption (Ferraz and
Finan (2011)) and the local implementation of federal cash transfer programs (de Janvry, Finan and Sadoulet
(2012)).
5See also Lee, Moretti, and Butler (2004), Lee (2008), Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), Vogl (2012) or Brollo
and Nannicini (2012) for other examples of RDD in close elections. This strategy has been adapted to study
gender differences in politics by Rehavi (2007), Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), Gagliarducci and Paserman
(2012) and Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2012).
6Anzia and Berry (2011) analyze gender differences across members of Congress in the U.S. in attracting
funds from federal discretionary programs.
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to prenatal care delivery. The public health system in Brazil is decentralized, spending is
mostly financed by the federal government, but municipalities are responsible for all decisions
regarding resource allocation. Thus, municipal policies are a relevant determinant of health
outcomes. Third, we analyze gender differences in corruption, using data from random audits
of municipal governments that allow us to construct an administrative measure of corruption,
instead of relying on survey measures.7 Fourth, we analyze changes in temporary public sector
employees, as temporary hires are a widely used political patronage instrument in Brazil
(Engerman and Sokoloff (2002); Weyland (1996); Mainwaring (2002); Ames (1995)). Finally,
we analyze whether the decision to run for re-election and the probability of re-election differ
between male and female mayors elected after contested mixed gender races.
Our results show that there are significant gender differences in terms of policy outcomes.
First, we find that female mayors attract twice as much discretionary transfers from the fed-
eral government than their male counterparts. Second, our results show that having a female
mayor leads to better health outcomes related to prenatal care delivery. In particular, mu-
nicipalities with a female mayor have 61 percent less women without prenatal medical visits
and 1.3 percent more regular (i.e. non-premature) births. These positive health effects are
concentrated on less educated mothers, who are more dependent on public health provision.
Third, we find that female mayors are less likely to engage in administrative irregularities.
The probability of observing a corruption episode is 33 to 28 percent lower in municipalities
with female mayors than in those with male mayors. Fourth, we analyze gender differences
in public employment. We find that male mayors hire about 50 percent more temporary
employees to work directly in the municipal administration than female mayors. However,
we do not find any significant differences across genders when analyzing permanent public
employees. Finally, when analyzing re-elections, we find no differences across genders in
the probability of running for re-election. Our results show, though, that female candidates
elected after a contested mixed election have a 50 percent lower probability of being re-elected
compared to their male counterparts. Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) study the relationship
7The relationship between the gender of the policymaker and corruption has received considerable at-
tention in the literature. For example, Swamy et al. (2001) use micro data to show that women are less
involved in bribery. Dollar et al. (2001) show that corruption is less severe in the countries where women
constitute a majority of parliamentary seats, senior positions in the government bureaucracy, and the labor
force. Beaman et al. (2009), by using random assignment of gender quotas in India, find that female leaders
accept less bribes than their male counterparts do.
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between the gender of the policymaker and re-election outcomes, among other things, in
close races for mayor in the United States. The authors find that male mayors adopt similar
policies compared to female ones, but female mayors are more likely to be re-elected. The
difference between our findings and theirs might be explained by the type of policies we study,
which are different from theirs, by the fact that in developing countries female politicians
are a lower proportion of politicians than in developed countries, and usually face different
attitudes and incentives and possibly by differences in attitudes toward women in Brazil and
United States.
To analyze whether local election incentives motivate differently male and female politi-
cians, we focus on two heterogeneous treatment effects that can plausibly capture the incen-
tives provided to politicians by municipal elections. First, we study term limits, as the ability
to run for re-election might affect the policies implemented by local politicians. Mayors in
Brazil are only allowed to run for a consecutive term one time, so we compare gender differ-
ences between mayors in their first and second terms. Second, we analyze whether mayors
behave differently when elections are approaching. Municipal elections in Brazil are held
every four years, at the same time, so we compare gender differences between pre-electoral
years (the last two years of the mandate) and non-electoral years (the first two years of the
mandate).
Our results suggests that male and female politicians may respond differently to local
election incentives. First, we find that male mayors tend to hire more temporary employees
to work directly in the municipal administration than their female counterparts only in their
first term, when they are allowed to run for re-election. This finding suggests that male
mayors might be promoting more political patronage to get re-elected than female mayors.
We also find that differences in terms of prenatal visits between municipalities with male
and female mayors arise only for politicians in their second-term, which is consistent with
the idea that lame-duck male mayors may perform worse than their female counterparts.8
Finally, we find that male mayors tend to hire more temporary public employees (relative to
female mayors) in the two years before the election, rather than in the first two years of their
8For transfers we find no significant differences across municipalities with mayors in their first and second
mandate. It should be noted that in Brazil, the effort of the mayor in attracting these transfers is not the
only determinant of the amount of transfers these municipalities receive. The interest of the president in
providing resources to municipalities is another important determinant.
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term.9
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Brazilian institutional framework.
Section 3 lays out our identification and estimation strategy. Section 4 discusses the empirical
results and validity tests. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutions and Data
2.1 The Brazilian federal system, the allocation of infrastructure
transfers and electoral data
The Brazilian presidential federal system takes place in a context of a multi-party system.10
The layers of political and administrative organization in Brazil are the federal government,
the states, the federal district and the municipalities. Municipalities are minor federative
units with an autonomous local government, ruled by a mayor, directly elected by citizens
to a four-year mandate, and a legislative body, also directly elected by voters. Mayors
of municipalities above 200,000 voters are directly elected by a majority runoff rule, while
mayors of municipalities below 200,000 voters are directly elected with plurality rule.11 The
elections of the President, governors, and members of Congress all take place at the same
time every four years, while municipal elections are staggered by two years and also take
place every four years. Before 1998 Brazilian mayors could not run for re-election, but after
1998, mayors were allowed to run for a second term. In our study we are considering two
municipal administration mandates in municipalities below 200,000 voters: 2001-2004 and
2005-2008. Electoral data come from Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.
Municipal administrators are responsible for delivering a relevant share of public services
and goods related to education, health, and infrastructure projects. The fact that may-
ors have veto power over the budget makes them the most important actors in deciding the
allocation of public goods and services. However, municipal administrations are highly finan-
cially constrained. Apart from some big cities, such as Brazilian state capitals, municipalities
9We find that the outcomes measuring discretionary transfers and percentage of women without a prenatal
visit do not vary across years within the term. One possibility is that intrinsic motivations are more important
for prenatal care outcomes or discretionary transfers than electoral incentives. Alternatively, the ability to
provide those public goods may differ across genders.
10This subsection relies heavily upon Brollo and Nannicini (2012).
11See Fujiwara (2011a) for an analysis of the effects of this electoral rule in Brazilian municipalities.
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strongly rely on state and federal transfers as their sources of revenue (tax revenue represents
only 5.5 percent of the municipal total revenues, on average). The most important source of
municipal revenues are federal transfers (on average amount to 65 percent of the municipal
budget). There are two different types of federal transfers: constitutional automatic transfers
(i.e. Fundo de Participac¸a˜o do Municipio - FPM and “Transfereˆncias Fundo a Fundo”); and
(2) discretionary transfers – CONVENIO agreements.12 Most of these transfers (82 percent)
are earmarked for infrastructure projects.13
This study focuses on discretionary transfers devoted to infrastructure projects, which
amount to about 15 percent of total municipal expenditure in infrastructures. These transfers
are related to budget items that involve the construction of buildings and bridges, the paving
of roads, the improvement of water and sewer systems, the purchase of ambulances, and so
on. We focus on this type of federal transfers because the bulk of the other revenues are
largely non-discretionary and hard to manipulate.14
Both mayors and the president have important roles in determining the allocation of
discretionary transfers. The amount of discretionary infrastructure transfers a municipal
government receives depends on three factors: (i) the effort of their municipal administration
in applying for transfers; (ii) the interest of a federal deputy in supporting the approval of the
budget law that refers to these transfers; and (iii) the interest of the President in executing
the budget amendment (i.e., send the money to that municipality).
Data on infrastructure transfers self-reported by municipal administration and are ob-
tained on the Brazilian National Treasure Website (Tesouro Nacional) –FINBRA dataset.15
12The allocation mechanism of FPM transfers (which corresponds to 75 percent of federal transfers)
depends on the population size and the state in which the municipality is located. From this total amount of
federal transfers received by each municipality, there are also fixed coefficients that establish the amount of
funds. 70 percent of FPM transfers are unrestricted and 30 percent to be converted into education and health
expenditures: 15 percent in education and 15 percent in health. Another type of constitutional transfers are
“Transfereˆncias Fundo a Fundo”. These transfers can be targeted to different areas (education, health, social
assistance, etc) and their allocation is based on income per-capita or number of children enrolled in school.
13We calculate these percentages with data from FINBRA. See the subsection below where we give detailed
information on our data.
14As a falsification test, we also performed RDD estimations on constitutional automatic transfers (FPM),
detecting no effect of gender on their allocation (results are available upon request).
15Only since 2002 has it been possible to distinguish discretionary from constitutional transfers that finance
infrastructure projects. For consistency, the period of analysis (2001-2008) considers the overall amount of
federal infrastructure transfers (Transfereˆncias de Capital). On average, 78 percent of the total amount of
infrastructure transfers is discretionary (CONVEˆNIO). Note that after year 2002 FINBRA brings information
on discretionary (CONVEˆNIO) and constitutional infrastructure transfers. The percentage of discretionary
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These data provide information from municipal and state annual balance sheets.16
2.2 The Health Care System in Brazil
One of the most important characteristics of the public health system in Brazil is decentral-
ization. Spending is mostly financed by the federal government, but the municipalities are
responsible for all decisions regarding resource allocation (Collins et al., 2000). Transfers are
directly sent from the central government to the municipalities. The amounts are defined by
constitution, transferred automatically and on a monthly basis (Transfereˆncias de Fundo a
Fundo) and are mostly intend to finance primary care.
Another source of primary health care is the Family Health Program (Programa Sau´de
na Famil´ıa), introduced by the municipal health secretariats in collaboration with the states
and the Ministry of Public Health. This program finances health education, immunization,
nutritional care, consultation with the doctor in basic specialities, dentist basic care, home
visits by nurse or community health worker, basic emergencies, minor operations in addition
to prenatal care, family planning activities and birth at home by a family doctor. The federal
government supplies technical support and finances the program. Federal funding includes a
fixed component based on population and income per capita, and the central government can
also make discretionary transfers based on requests from the municipalities. As municipal
administrations are responsible for the allocation of these resources, municipal policies are a
relevant determinant of health outcomes.
To analyze health outcomes, we use data from the Information System on Live Births
(SINASC). This system is managed by the Secretariat of Health Surveillance, in conjunction
with state and municipal health departments. Each state health department collects data on
live birth certificates in healthcare facilities and on the registries (for home births) and inputs
all the information into the SINASC. The Ministry of Health then assembles the data. This
transfers in the total amount of infrastructure transfers is calculated by using the average for these years
(2003-2008).
16The variable used in the first part of the analysis is the log of total amount of the per-capita infrastructure
transfers. We choose the log specification given the skewness of the transfers received by the municipalities.
Municipalities that do not receive infrastructure transfers are not dropped when we run the log specification.
For the log transformation we considered a reported amount of R$ 1,00, then, the log amount is zero.
All budget variables are in real values, base year 2006 (IPCA - FGV deflator). Alternatively, we estimate a
Poisson regression considering as an outcome the transfers per capita, and our results are unchanged. Results
are available upon request.
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dataset contains monthly information on number of prenatal medical visits and on period of
pregnancy (weeks). The variables we are employing for this analysis is the share of pregnant
women without prenatal medical visits and births that are not considered as pre-mature (at
least 37 weeks).
2.3 Measuring corruption
Data on corruption come from random audits of municipal governments. These data are
coded from audit reports by Brollo et al. (2013).17 The main categories of irregularities
described in the audit reports are: 1) illegal procurement practices, which occur when one
of the following is reported: a) competition has been limited, for example, when associates
of the mayor’s family or friends receive non-public information related to the value of the
project, b) bid value has been manipulated, c) irregular firm wins the bid process, d) the
minimum number of bids is not attained, or e) the required procurement procedure is not
executed; 2) fraud ; 3) over-invoicing, occurring when there is evidence that public goods or
services are purchased for a value above the market price; and 4) diversion of funds. Our
definition of corruption is a dummy variable that indicates whether at least one episode of
any of the types of irregularities described above is detected by auditors (similar to Brollo et
al. (2013)).
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Identification: Regression Discontinuity
Identifying the effects of gender on policy outcomes is a daunting task. A comparison between
municipalities with a female mayor and those with a male mayor will probably generate
biased estimates due to endogeneity issues. For instance, local policies might be correlated
with municipality-specific characteristics such as attitudes towards women or demographic
characteristics, all of which could also influence the gender of the local mayor. Define τi,t(1)
as the potential outcome of municipality i if the mayor is a woman, and τi,t(0) as the potential
outcome of the same municipality if the mayor is a man, in a specific time period t.18 We
17Similar measures of corruption are used by Ferraz and Finan (2008; 2011) and Brollo (2011).
18In our equations, t is year or term depending on whether we have data for our outcome at the year or
at the term level.
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are interested in estimating the difference in potential outcome in mixed-gender race, i.e.
E(τi,t(1) − τi,t(0)|j ∈ Ω). The problem of causal inference is that, at a given point in time,
we cannot observe both potential outcomes. That is, it is impossible to know the outcomes
a city that has a female mayor would have had with a male mayor. The intuition of our
identification strategy is that cities in which a woman won against a man by a narrow
margin can be a good counterfactual for those places in which the opposite occurred (a man
won again a woman by a narrow margin). In this setting the identification comes from the
assumption that in close races random factors are crucial to decide elections. Therefore the
probability of winning is the same for both female and male candidates.
The variable Fit defines the treatment status: Fit = 1 if the mayor is a woman, and Fit = 0
otherwise. The observed outcome is thus: τit = Fit · τit(1) + (1− Fit) · τit(0). The estimand
of interest is the ATE, E[τit(1)− τit(0)], defined over some sub-population of interest.
Specifically, we define the treatment group as the municipalities that have a mayor who
is woman elected in a mixed-gender race. Assignment to treatment can be formalized as:
Femaleit = 1[MVit ≥ 0] (1)
where MVit is the female candidate margin of victory in municipality i during term t and
1[.] the indicator function. It is specified as the difference between the vote for the female
candidate minus the vote share of the male candidate, meaning it will have positive values if
the mixed-gender electoral race resulted in a female mayor. This measure is thus greater than
zero in municipalities where the mayor is woman, and lower than zero otherwise. At the zero
threshold, MVit = 0, the gender of the mayor Fit sharply changes from zero to one. MVit can
be seen as a random variable depending on observable and unobservable variables, as well as
on random events on election day. The standard RDD assumption is that potential outcomes
must be a continuous function of the running variable at the threshold (Hahn, Todd, and
Van der Klaauw, 2001). We test this assumption in section 4.4.19
The ATE in close elections is thus:
γ ≡ E[τit(1)− τjt(0)|MVit = 0] = lim
MVit↓0
Yit − lim
MVit↑0
Yit (2)
19It should be noted that the assumptions refer to the potential outcomes. The actual outcome will be
only one, of course, and if gender plays a role in affecting outcomes it will also be discontinuous at MV = 0.
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γ is defined as a local effect, because it captures the impact of the gender of the mayor on
the outcome only for towns around the threshold MV = 0 (i.e. for the elections that were
decided for a margin that is tiny enough).
3.2 Estimation
We first analyze whether gender is correlated with our outcomes by estimating the following
OLS equations:
τit = ρ0 + ρ1Fit + µt + ηit (3)
where τit is the outcome of interest in municipality i in time period t, Fit is a dummy that
is one when the mayor of the municipality is female, µt are year fixed effects and standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level because the same city may be observed in
different mayoral terms or years.20 We report coefficient ρˆ1, which does not have a causal
interpretation because the gender of the politician might be correlated with the error term.21
We use two different methods to estimate the ATE expressed in equation (2). First, we
fit a p-order polynomial in MVit on either side of the threshold MVit = 0:
τit =
p∑
k=0
(ρkMV
k
it ) + Fit
p∑
k=0
(pikMV
k
it ) + µt + ηit, (4)
where MVit is the margin of victory in municipality i in time period t and standard errors are
clustered at the city level. The estimated coefficient pˆi0 identifies the ATE at the threshold
MVit = 0.
22
We then follow Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and use a local linear regression approach,
which restricts the sample to municipalities in the interval MVit ∈ [−h,+h] and estimates
the model:
τit = ρ0 + ρ1MVit + δ0Fit + δ1Fit ·MVit + µt + ηit (5)
20It should be noted that we can include year fixed-effects only when we have yearly data for the outcome
of interest.
21For example, this would happen if places that are more tolerant toward women are more likely to elect
female mayors, and these places also adopt different policies.
22While the benefit of this estimation strategy is the possibility of keeping the whole sample, the cost is
that results might potentially be sensitive to outcome values for observations far away from the threshold
(see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). We follow the standard procedure of fitting a third order polynomial.
We computed our results with lower or higher order polynomials (i.e. identifying the effect on observations
respectively farther and closer to the threshold) and our results are robust to different specifications. Results
are available upon request).
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where standard errors are clustered at the town level, and δˆ0 identifies the ATE at the
threshold MVit = 0.
Finally we check for treatment effect heterogeneity in separate sub-samples. The intuition
for this test is simple. Assume that Dit captures a given heterogeneity dimension. We are
considering two dimensions that aim to capture whether electoral competition per se may
exacerbate gender differences in policies: 1) whether the mayor is eligible for re-election, and
2) last two years of the mayoral mandate (when municipal elections are approaching). We
estimate:
τit =
p∑
k=0
(ρkMV
k
it ) + Fit
p∑
k=0
(pikMV
k
it )+
+Dit ·
[ p∑
k=0
(αkMV
k
it ) + Fit
p∑
k=0
(βkMV
k
it )
]
+ ξit.
(6)
As a result, pi0 identifies the treatment effect in Dit = 0, pi0 + βˆ0 in Dit = 1, and βˆ0 the
difference between the two. The interpretation of the difference between the two sub-samples
should not be causal.
4 Results
4.1 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Brazil has 5,567 municipalities. Our study encompasses all municipalities for which we have
non-missing outcome data and with mixed gender races in two elections: October 2000 and
October 2004.23 Mayors are in office for four years, i.e. from 2001 to 2004 and from 2005 to
2008, respectively.
To implement our identification strategy in the Brazilian multi-party system we restrict
our sample to races with two candidates where one candidate is a woman and the other
is a man. We only consider two candidates elections because in races with more than two
candidates there is a discontinuity of the density of the running variable, probably because
most candidates are men.24 Races with only two candidates amount to 51 percent of the
23For each outcome of interest we have checked that missing values are balanced around the threshold
(available upon request).
24For instance, the discontinuity of the log-density of our running variable for the elections with three
candidates is estimated in -0.094 with a standard error of 0.054. Appendix Figure A1 shows the density of
the samples of elections with three candidates and election with more than three candidates.
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total. If we further restrict the sample to elections where we have two candidates of different
gender, we end up with a sample of 723 races, representing 7 percent of the races in each
term. To evaluate the external validity of our sample, we compare municipal and mayoral
characteristics between our sample and the rest of the Brazilian elections. Table 1 and Table
2 display the results. Races in our sample, among other things, are more likely to happen in
smaller and poorer cities. Table 3 presents the results of a similar exercise for our outcomes.
Municipalities in our sample receive more discretionary infrastructure transfers.
Our estimation strategy controls for municipality-specific characteristics. Therefore we
should not expect any difference in municipal characteristics between treatment and control
groups around the cut-off MVit = 0. Our dataset allows us to test a vast array of observable
municipal characteristics, including geographic location of the city, income and population.
These balance tests for municipal characteristics are reported in Table 4.25 It’s particularly
interesting that even the gender wage gap at the municipality level is balanced across the
cut-off MVit = 0.
26 Table 4 also reports the results of balance tests for several mayoral char-
acteristics (party affiliation, education, experience, etc) showing that there is no discontinuity
around the cut-off for any of these observable characteristics. This is important as differences
in mayoral characteristics could affect the interpretation of the results. For example, if men
are more likely to face a binding term limit our estimates could potentially reflect the effect
of this difference, and not gender differences per-se.
The results of these balance tests are corroborated by visual inspection. Figures 1, 2, 3,
and 4 show scatterplots of the mean of municipal and mayoral characteristics. The variable
on the x-axis is the margin of victory, and the observations are averaged within bins of 2
percent of margin of victory. We plot the average of each of these variables for municipalities
in which women won (at the right of cut-off MVit = 0) and for municipalities where men
won (at the left of cut-off MVit = 0). Given that the density of the margin of victory
is concentrated around zero, points closer to zero (close races) are both more relevant for
25Note that we perform these balance tests by applying a polynomial approximation. We also did the
same check by applying a local linear regression with optimal bandwidth and we find nearly identical results.
Results are available upon request.
26This variable is computed using micro data from the 2000 Brazilian demographic census. We estimate,
for each Brazilian municipality, whether the log of the hourly wage is affected by observable characteristics
(gender, age, residence region, education, occupation and race). The gender coefficient obtained in these
regressions is our measure of gender gap.
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our strategy and contain more information compared to those far from the zero margin of
victory.27 We find no discontinuities around the threshold for all variables.28
4.2 The Consequences of a Female Candidate Winning a Mixed
Gender Close Election
Our main results are reported in panels A and B of Table 5. For all outcomes we report OLS
results and two different specifications for the RDD estimates. In particular, we show our
baseline results from a split third order polynomial specification which considers the entire
mixed gender sample and the results for local linear regressions with optimal bandwidth.29,30
In panel A of the Table 5 we report the results for total, discretionary and non-discretionary
infrastructure transfers, health outcomes, and corruption. The results in column 1 show that
women attract significantly higher infrastructure transfers for their municipalities.These re-
sults are driven by discretionary infrastructure transfers (column 2), as we find no significant
differences for non-discretionary infrastructure transfers (column 3). This result is reassur-
ing, as non-discretionary transfers are rule-based and thus should not be affected by the
gender of the mayor. In terms of economic magnitude our results show that female mayors
attract twice as much discretionary transfers from the federal government than their male
counterparts.
Columns 4 and 5 in panel A of the Table 5 report the results for our health care outcomes:
percentage of women who did not attend any prenatal visits and percentage of births in
27See Figure 7.
28It is particularly interesting to note that we find convergence in close elections also for the observables
that do not seem to be balanced for elections that are not close. For example, as can be seen from the
graphs of both age and the educational variables, female mayors are on average substantially more educated
and younger than their male counterparts. The finding that female leaders are more educated than male
ones is consistent with what Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) find for Italian politicians, and the result
is also consistent with what Goldin, Katz and Kuziemko (2009) find recently for American college women.
However, in close elections even those educational and age variables do converge together and the jump is
not statistically significant.
29Our baseline results are obtained using a third order polynomial. But we also find similar results using
a second-order or fourth-order polynomial and a local linear specification using optimal bandwidths (Results
are available upon request). In addition, we repeated the analysis implementing a simple t-test of the means
of all of our outcomes in closed intervals around the threshold MV = 0 (with intervals getting smaller and
smaller) and in most cases found statistically significant differences between municipalities headed by women
and men, as shown in the Appendix Table A1.
30We compute optimal bandwidth with the algorithm by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2012).
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which the baby was not born premature.31 Our RDD estimates in column 4 show us that the
percentage of women without any prenatal visits is lower in municipalities headed by female
mayors. Moreover, in these municipalities, the probability of a pre-mature birth is relatively
lower (column 5). According to our third order split polynomial specification, we find that
the share of pregnant women without any prenatal visits decreases by 1.6 percent (or 61
percent of the baseline mean) and regular births (i.e. the not pre-mature ones) increase by
1.2 percent (or 1.3 percent of the baseline mean) in municipalities headed by female mayors.32
One potential interpretation for these findings is that women mayors are monitoring closer
the (given) health resources allocated to a municipality. An alternative interpretation is that
women attract more transfers and this makes easier to provide health care. To distinguish
between these two alternative channels, we would need to obtain data on the quality of the
public health spending, and on the proportion of discretionary transfers that are allocated
to health. Unfortunately this information is not available at the municipality level for our
sample period.
Column 6 in panel A of Table 5 shows results for our corruption measure, which is a
dummy variable that equals one if the mayor is found to be involved in at least one irregularity
classified as corruption. For these regressions we can use only the sample of municipalities
that were audited by the program. The results show that women are less likely to be involved
in corruption episodes, on average. The size of the estimated coefficient is relatively similar
across specifications and implies that the probability of observing a corruption episode is 33
to 28 percent lower in municipalities with female mayors than in ones with male mayors.
Despite the small sample size, it is reassuring that corruption data are obtained from a
random sampling procedure, given that the Brazilian Anti-Corruption Program randomizes
the auditing process.
Visual inspection of the outcomes in Figure 5 confirms the results described above, as
there are visible discontinuities around the cut-off. In this figure, outcomes are averaged into
bins of intervals of the margin of victory. Note that the bins closer to the cut-off contain
more observations, given that the density of our running variable (margin of victory of the
31Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2012) is a paper contemporaneous and independently started from ours
that looks at the relationship between child mortality and gender of the politician. See also Clots-Figueras
(2012) on the relationship between education and the gender of the politician.
32A third outcome that can be analyzed from our dataset is babies’ birthweight. We find that this outcome
is not affected by the gender of the policymaker. Results are available upon request.
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female candidate) is concentrated around zero.
The first two columns of Panel B of Table 5, display the results for public employees hired
to work directly for the municipal administration. We look at two variables: the number of
temporary public employees (column 2, in logs), and the number permanent public employees
(column 3, in logs).33 We find that female mayors hire around 50 percent fewer temporary
public employees than male mayors. We do not find a statistically significant difference for
permanent public employees. Increases in temporary public sector employees are a widely
used political patronage instrument in Brazil. If this is the case, we would expect this outcome
to be sensitive to changes in the political environment of the municipality. We provide more
evidence regarding the link between temporary public employment in Brazilian municipalities
and politics in the next section.
In the last two columns of Panel B we look at the effect of gender on the probability
of running for re-election and on the probability of being re-elected. The results in column
4 show that female mayors in our sample are around 20 percentage points less likely to be
re-elected than male mayors, out of a baseline mean of 38 percent. This effect is particularly
surprising, especially in light of the findings discussed above, which show that women provide
better outcomes and attract more resources. The results in column 5 show that the decision
to run for re-election is not affected by gender.34 These findings are confirmed by visual
inspection of Figure 6.
Public health services target mostly lower income and less educated segments of the
population. So if female mayors are improving the provision of public health services, we
would expect to find a larger effect on this segment of the population. To test this we
repeat our analysis of health outcomes for separate educational categories. These results are
reported in Table 6 and show that the effect of having a female mayor on health outcomes is
33Data on the number of public employees hired to work directly for the municipal administration come
from the survey Perfil dos Municipios Brasileiros 2005 and 2008. Unfortunately we were not able to obtain
these data for more years. This implies that we are considering for one term both the first and last year of
the mandate.
34It is important to note that, even if female mayors after a mixed gender close election are less likely to
be re-elected, this does not imply that female mayors that were elected during a close election are less likely
to be in a second term. Our outcome “Probability of re-election” refers to the election subsequent to the
mixed gender close election. This means that the margin of victory of the incumbent mayor in the subsequent
elections or the gender of the opponent are most likely different. On the other hand, the variable on which
we implement the balance test refers to a second term during the current election. The latter is balanced, as
shown in the graph in the bottom right of Figure 3.
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concentrated on less educated mothers who are more dependent on public health provision.35
For most of our empirical results, the size of the effect of gender in the RDD estimates is
larger, and more likely to be statistically different than zero, than the effect estimated by the
OLS specifications. This could be explained by at least two reasons. First, the RD design
controls for city-specific confounding factors, which might attenuate the effect estimated using
OLS.36 Second, the RD coefficient is identified by close elections, whereas the OLS coefficient
averages over all races (competitive and non-competitive races). If politicians of different
genders behave differently in competitive and non-competitive races, this could explain the
differences between OLS and RDD coefficients. For instance, as discussed above, competition
might exacerbate gender differences.
4.3 Gender Differences and Local Election Incentives
In this section we analyze whether term limits and electoral cycles may play a role in ex-
plaining the gender differences that we find. As discussed above, electoral competition could
generate gender differences in campaign strategies and policies if men and women respond
differently to incentives.
Table 7 reports the results of these estimations, which follow the specification in equation
(6). Panel A reports results exploiting term limits. Mayors in Brazil can not be in office for
more than two consecutive terms. Panel B focuses on the timing of elections. In particular,
we compare pre-electoral years (two last years of the municipal administration mandate)
versus first years of the mandate. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the results using discretionary
infrastructure transfers, no prenatal visits and temporary public employee as dependent
variables, respectively.37
The results in Panel A show that female mayors hire less temporary public employees than
35Fujiwara (2011a) studies the effect of voting technology on health outcomes, and finds that the effects
of this policy are concentrated on uneducated mothers as well.
36Our empirical strategy controls for unobservable city-specific confounding factors, but it is still possible
that some individual level characteristics are correlated with the gender of the mayor. While we acknowledge
this limitation, which is probably the main empirical challenge for this literature, we believe that it is
reassuring that all of our individual level observable variables converge in close elections, as confirmed by
visual inspection of Figures 3, and 4.
37Re-election outcomes are by construction available only for mayors in their first term, because of the
Brazilian two-term-limit legislation. Hence we cannot perform this exercise on those outcomes. Additionally,
we did not include the heterogeneity for the non premature births outcome, given that coefficients are too
imprecisely estimated and are not significant in both sub-samples. Results are available upon request.
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their male counterparts only in their first term. Additionally, the difference we find between
municipalities governed by women and men in terms of prenatal visits are present only when
mayors are in their second term. On the other hand, we find that the differences between
men and women in terms of transfers exist in both periods. The results for temporary public
employment and prenatal visits suggest that policy responses to the possibility of running
for re-election might be gender differentiated.
These findings, and in particular the hiring of public employees, might potentially ra-
tionalize the finding that men who win a close race against a woman are more likely to be
re-elected. First, there is the direct channel of rewarding a politician who provides public
jobs. Second, these new public employees might be directly involved in tasks related to elec-
toral campaign of the incumbent. The results for prenatal visits seem to be driven by lame
duck mayors, suggesting that men deliver worst outcomes compared to women particularly
when mayors are not allowed to run again for election.
The results in Panel B show that gender differences in transfers and the health results
seem to be independent from electoral cycles. However, we also find that male mayors hire
relatively more temporary public employees than women when elections are approaching.
This last finding is potentially consistent with political patronage and re-election incentives
having a role in explaining gender differences in politicians’ behavior, while it is inconsistent
with an explanation purely based on differential preferences over public good provision. The
causal interpretation of these results rests on an additional assumption. We need to assume
the dimension along which the heterogeneity is measured is independent from other factors
that affect gender differences in politics. Thus, in the spirit of Grembi, Nannicini and Troiano
(2012) and Brollo et al. (2013), we perform an additional robustness check by checking
whether the gender differences we find in Table 7 are robust to a specification including a
full set of interactions with covariates at the municipality level and individual level, and the
results are virtually unchanged.38
4.4 Validity tests
RDD estimates in close races rely on the assumption that political candidates cannot manip-
ulate the electoral outcomes. To test this assumption we conduct several robustness checks.
38Results are available upon request.
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First, we check for nonrandom sorting by visually inspecting the histogram of the margin of
victory (see Figure 7). We can see that there are no clear spikes at the right or the left-hand
side of the discontinuity. Second, we address the concern of non-random sorting by formally
testing the continuity of the density of the margin of victory, following McCrary (2008), in
Figure 8. This procedure tests the null hypothesis of continuity of the density of the mar-
gin of victory at the zero threshold, and it is implemented by running kernel local linear
regressions of the log of the density separately on both sides of zero. We find no evidence of
discontinuities in the margin of victory of the female candidate.
Another concern when performing a regression discontinuity design is that results might
driven by the specific functional forms considered. Our baseline results are obtained using
a third order polynomial . We also find similar results using a second-order or fourth-order
polynomial and a local linear specification using optimal bandwidths39. To further alleviate
concerns arising from the specific RDD functional forms considered, we repeated the analysis
implementing a simple t-test of the means of all of our outcomes in closed intervals around
the threshold MV = 0 (with intervals getting smaller and smaller) and in most cases found
statistically significant differences between municipalities headed by women and men, as
shown in the Appendix Table A1.
Finally, we perform a set of placebo tests to rule out the possibility that our results arise
from random chance rather than a true underlining causal relationship. To do this, in the
spirit of DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2012), for all our outcome variables we conduct a set of
RDD estimations at false thresholds of the margin of victory. In particular, for each outcome
we estimate 580 RDD regressions considering fake margins of victory between 30 percent
and 1 percent below and above the threshold (using increments of 0.1 percent). In Appendix
Figure A2, we plot the cumulative density function of the t-statistics of the fake treatment
effects from these regressions. At these false thresholds, we expect to find no systematic
evidence of treatment effects.40 The figures show that most of the coefficients from these
placebo tests are not statistically significant, providing strong support to the robustness of
our main results.
39Results are available upon request
40The figure reports the t-test from a specification with 3rd-order polynomial; results are virtually un-
changed with a local linear specification in an optimal bandwidth.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the effect of the gender of the policymaker on policies and outcomes,
and present new evidence suggesting that men and women may respond differently to local
elections incentives (term limits and municipal electoral cycles). By analyzing a rich micro
dataset from municipalities in Brazil and using a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design in
close electoral races we find that municipalities ruled by female mayors receive more discre-
tionary transfers and have better health outcomes. Male mayors tend to hire more temporary
public employees before municipal elections and are more likely to be involved in corruption
than their female counterparts. We additionally find that male mayors tend to hire more
temporary public employees (relative to female mayors) when elections are approaching and
when they are eligible for re-election.
Our results raise a number of questions for further research. First, our findings suggest
that politicians of different gender might respond differentially to local election incentives.
This finding is consistent with the experimental literature, which tends to find that men
are more willing to self-select into competitive environments than women and that their
performance is more sensitive to the level of incentives provided (Gneezy et al. (2003),
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), Niederle et al. (2008), Dohmen and Falk (2011), Attali et
al. (2011)). Building a bridge between experimental literature and research on gender in
political situations is an exciting direction for future research.
Second, we are able to identify our effect in close elections, characterized by an high
degree of competition. Our identification strategy does not allow us to identify the link
between gender and policies in situations characterized by absence of electoral competition.
Competition might per se enhance gender differences. A rapidly growing literature is making
political competition an endogenous variable that can be chosen to maximize voters’ welfare
(Caselli et al., 2012).
Third, and related to the previous point, our results are obtained in a setting where there
is competition among politicians of different genders and where these politicians decide to run
for office against each other. It is thus not clear whether these findings would also apply to a
setting with quotas reserved for female politicians. In fact, an interesting direction for future
research would be to understand whether policies aimed at increasing female participation
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in politics through quotas that restrict cross-gender competition have different implications
than policies aimed at increasing the number of women competing in open elections.
Finally, it is unclear whether our results would persist in countries with different attitudes
toward women compared to Brazil. Recent research suggest different channels through which
attitudes toward women may affect policies and outcomes (Goldin and Rouse (2000), Beaman
et al. (2009), Pino (2011) and Givati and Troiano, (2012)). Policymakers may benefit from
explicitly accounting for those slow-moving constraints when designing policies aimed at
increasing the participation of women in politics.
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Figures
Figure 1: Balance Tests – Pre-Treatment Municipal Characteristics
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. This sample
considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. Income refers to monthly per-capita income in 2000
and is measured in Brazilian reais. Population refers to the number of inhabitants. Literacy rate is the
fraction of people above age 20 who are literate. Urbanization is the fraction of people living in urban areas.
Electricity is the fraction of houses with access to electricity. Water is the fraction of houses linked to the
water system. Sewer is the fraction of houses linked to the sewerage system. Radio equals one if there is at
least one local radio station in the municipality. Absenteeism is the fraction of voters that failure to appear
in the election day. Gender wage gap is the estimated gender salary gap, see paper for details about the
estimation of this variable.
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Figure 2: Balance Tests – Invariant Municipal Characteristics
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
No
rth
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
MV female
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
No
rth
ea
st
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
MV female
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Ce
nt
er
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
MV female
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
So
ut
he
as
t
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
MV female
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
So
ut
h
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
MV female
-1
00
0
0
10
00
20
00
30
00
40
00
Ar
ea
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
MV female
Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The green lines
are the 95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals.
This sample considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. North, Northeast, Center, South, and
Southeast are the Brazilian macro-regions. Area refers to the area size of the municipality.
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Figure 3: Balance Tests – Mayoral Education and Political Experience
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The green lines
are the 95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals.
This sample considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. Primary Education is equal to 1 if the
mayor has at most an elementary school degree. Higher Education is equal to 1 if the mayor has at least high
school degree. College is equal to 1 if the mayor has at least college degree. Politician is equal to 1 if the
mayor has previous experience in politics. Term limit is equal to 1 if the mayor is not eligible for re-election
because is in a second consecutive term. Age is the age of the candidate calculated in years during the 2008
elections.
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Figure 4: Balance Test – Mayoral Political Party Affiliation
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The green lines
are the 95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals.
This sample considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. PSDB, DEM, PMDB, PT is the fraction
of municipalities where the mayor is affiliated with PSDB, DEM, PMDB, and PT, respectively. President’s
coalition is the fraction of municipalities the mayor is affiliated to one of the president’s coalition party.
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Figure 5: The Effects of Gender on Infrastructure Transfers, Health Outcomes and on Cor-
ruption
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The green lines
are the 95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals.
This sample considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. Discretionary infrastructure transfers and
Non-discretionary infrastructure transfers are yearly transfers from the federal government to municipalities
(log of per-capita real values in 2000 Brazilian reais). No prenatal visits is the yearly fraction of pregnant
women without any prenatal visit before the delivery at the municipality level. Non pre-mature births is the
yearly fraction of births that are not pre-mature at the municipality level. Charges of corruption equals one
if at least one episode of corruption is reported.
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Figure 6: The Effects of Gender on the Municipal Public Employment and on Electoral
Outcomes
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Notes. The blue line is a split third-order polynomial in Margin of Victory of the female candidate in the
municipality i and mandate t, fitted separately on each side of the margin of victory (MV female) thresholds
at zero. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0
when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male. The green lines are the 95 percent
confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals. The green lines
are the 95 percent confidence interval of the polynomial. Scatter points are averaged over 2 percent intervals.
The sample for re-elections probabilities considers races in 2000 and 2004 municipal elections. The sample
for public employment considers races in 2004 municipal elections. Permanent public employee denote
the log of number of permanent public employees hired to work directly in the municipal administration.
Temporary public employee denote the log of number of temporary public employees hired to work directly
in the municipal administration. Re-election is equal to 1 if the incumbent mayor is re-elected. Re-run is
equal to 1 if the incumbent mayor re-run the subsequent election. The last two variables are defined for
mayors who are eligible to run for re-election.
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Figure 7: Frequency of Margin of Victory, Two Candidates Mixed-Gender Races
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Notes. Frequency of two-candidate mixed gender races for term 2001 and 2005. MVit > 0 when the winner
candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is female, MVit < 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality
i and mandate t is male.
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Figure 8: McCrary Test, Two Candidates Mixed-Gender Races
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Notes. Weighted kernel estimation of the log density of our running variable (Margin of
Victory of the female candidate) performed separately on either side of the zero Margin of
Victory threshold. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate
t is female, MVit < 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is
male. (discontinuity estimate: point estimate -0.049 and standard error (0.071)). Optimal
bin-width and bin-size as in McCrary (2008). This sample considers races in 2000 and 2004
municipal elections.
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Tables
Table 1: Municipal Characteristics by Gender – Mixed Races vs Other Races
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
other obs mixed obs p-value
races races
Municipal characteristics
Population 24,753 10,054 12,317 723 0.000
Income per-capita (R$) 163 10,054 131 723 0.000
Literacy rate 0.558 10,054 0.502 723 0.000
Urban 0.589 10,054 0.553 723 0.000
Water supply 0.581 10,054 0.549 723 0.000
Electricity 0.870 10,054 0.839 723 0.000
Sewer 0.229 10,054 0.170 723 0.000
Absenteeism 0.185 10,054 0.176 723 0.016
Radio 0.210 10,054 0.109 723 0.000
Gender wage gap 0.134 10,054 0.101 723 0.000
North 0.082 10,054 0.084 723 0.832
Northeast 0.313 10,054 0.487 723 0.000
Center 0.082 10,054 0.093 723 0.316
South 0.216 10,054 0.130 723 0.000
Southeast 0.306 10,054 0.206 723 0.000
Notes. Other races is the sample of all other elections that is not considered in the sample
Two-candidate mixed races. Two-candidate mixed races sample where one candidate is
female and the other is male. Columns (1) and (3) report the average values in the respec-
tive samples; obs is the number of observations; p-value refers to the statistical significance
of the difference between means. Population is the number of resident inhabitants in 2000.
Income refers to monthly per-capita income in 2000 and is measured in Brazilian reais.
Urban population is the fraction of people living in urban areas. Water is the fraction of
houses with access to the water system. Sewer is the fraction of houses with access to the
sewerage system. Electricity is the fraction of houses with access to electricity. Absen-
teeism is the fraction of voters that failure to appear in the election day. Literacy rate is
the fraction of people above age 20 who are literate; Presence of local radio station is equal
to 1 if there is at least one local radio station in the municipality; Gender wage gap is the
estimated gender salary gap, see paper for details about the estimation of this variable.
North, Northeast, Center, South, and Southeast are the Brazilian macro-regions.
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Table 2: Mayoral Characteristics by Gender – Mixed Races vs Other Races
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
other obs mixed obs p-value
races races
Mayoral characteristics
Term limit 0.288 10,042 0.319 723 0.083
Politician 0.098 10,052 0.112 723 0.233
College 0.398 10,054 0.398 723 0.841
High School 0.402 10,054 0.841 723 0.650
Primary education 0.847 10,054 0.159 723 0.650
President’s coalition 0.152 10,054 0.248 723 0.172
Married 0.779 10,054 0.818 723 0.008
Age 53.015 10,050 53.904 723 0.665
PSDB 0.270 10,054 0.160 723 0.567
DEM (PFL) 0.168 10,054 0.212 723 0.000
PMDB 0.208 10,054 0.225 723 0.262
PT 0.054 10,054 0.030 723 0.006
Notes. Other races is the sample of all other elections that is not considered in the sample
Two-candidate mixed races. Two-candidate mixed races sample where one candidate is
female and the other is male. Columns (1) and (3) report the average values in the
respective samples; obs is the number of observations; p-value refers to the statistical
significance of the difference between means. Politician is equal to 1 if the mayor has
previous experience in politics. College is equal to 1 if the mayor has at least college
degree. High School is equal to 1 if the mayor has at least high school degree. Primary
Education is equal to 1 if the mayor has at most an elementary school degree. President’s
coalition is the fraction of municipalities the mayor is affiliated to one of the president’s
coalition party. PSDB, DEM, PMDB, PT is the fraction of municipalities where the
mayor is affiliated with PSDB, DEM, PMDB, and PT, respectively. Married is equal to
1 if the mayor is married. Age is the age of the candidate calculated in years during the
2008 elections.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Outcomes: Mixed Races vs Other Races
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
other obs mixed obs p-value
races races
Re-election rate 0.352 7,155 0.347 493 0.806
Re-run rate 0.573 7,155 0.549 493 0.290
Permanent public employees 1.641 5,012 1.374 382 0.028
Temporary public employees 2.979 5,008 2.833 382 0.217
No pre-mature births 0.946 40,237 0.950 2,894 0.000
No pre-natal visits 0.025 40,237 0.026 2,894 0.279
Total infrastructure transfer 2.631 33,557 2.773 2,425 0.652
Non discretionary infrastructure transfer 0.659 33,559 0.646 2,425 0.000
Discretionary infrastructure transfer 1.973 33,557 2.126 2,425 0.000
Charges of corruption 0.766 2,057 0.828 163 0.070
Notes. Other races is the sample of all other elections that is not considered in the sample Two-
candidate mixed gender races. Two-candidate mixed gender races sample considers only two-candidates
races where one candidate is female and the other is male. Columns (1) and (3) report the average
values in the respective samples; obs is the number of observations; p-value refers to the statistical
significance of the difference between means in column (1) and column (3). Re-election rate denotes
the fraction of incumbent mayor eligible to run for re-election that is re-elected. Re-run rate denotes the
fraction of incumbent mayor eligible that re-run the subsequent election. Permanent public employee
denote the log of number of permanent public employees hired to work directly in the municipal
administration. Temporary public employee denote the log of number of temporary public employees
hired to work directly in the municipal administration. Non pre-mature births is the fraction of births
that are not pre-mature. Non pre-natal visits is the fraction of pregnant women without any pre-natal
visit before the delivery. Non discretionary infrastructure transfers and Discretionary infrastructure
transfers are yearly transfers from the federal government to municipalities (log of per-capita real
values in 2000 Brazilian reais). Charges of corruption is the fraction of audited municipalities with at
least one episode of corruption reported.
36
T
ab
le
4:
D
is
co
n
ti
n
u
it
ie
s
of
T
ow
n
an
d
M
ay
or
al
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
in
M
ix
ed
C
lo
se
R
ac
es
,
R
D
D
E
st
im
at
es
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
P
an
el
A
B
ra
zi
lia
n
m
ac
ro
-r
eg
io
ns
So
ut
he
as
t
So
ut
h
C
en
te
r
N
or
th
ea
st
N
or
th
Fe
m
al
e
-0
.0
02
0.
07
8
0.
05
3
-0
.1
40
0.
01
1
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
53
)
(0
.0
91
)
(0
.0
47
)
P
an
el
B
P
re
-d
et
er
m
in
an
t
to
w
n’
s
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
L
it
er
ac
y
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
W
at
er
U
rb
an
In
co
m
e
P
op
ul
at
io
n
Se
w
er
R
ad
io
A
bs
en
te
ei
sm
W
ag
e
ra
te
su
pp
ly
ga
p
Fe
m
al
e
0.
02
2
0.
02
6
0.
01
6
-0
.0
09
8.
87
8
-2
02
-0
.0
33
0.
04
3
0.
00
8
-0
.0
11
(0
.0
24
)
(0
.0
32
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
35
)
(1
4.
34
3)
(2
,6
44
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
50
)
(0
.0
15
)
(0
.0
26
)
P
an
el
C
M
ay
or
al
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
T
er
m
P
T
P
M
D
B
D
E
M
P
SD
B
P
re
si
de
nt
’s
M
ar
ri
ed
A
ge
P
ri
m
ar
y
H
ig
h
C
ol
le
ge
P
ol
it
ic
ia
n
L
im
it
co
al
it
io
n
ed
uc
at
io
n
sc
ho
ol
Fe
m
al
e
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
18
0.
00
7
-0
.0
75
0.
04
2
-0
.0
19
-2
.8
53
-0
.0
28
-0
.1
09
0.
10
9
0.
06
9
0.
01
9
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.0
30
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
74
)
(0
.0
70
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
75
)
(1
.8
61
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.0
86
)
(0
.0
61
)
O
bs
.
72
3
72
3
72
3
72
3
72
3
72
3
72
3
72
3
72
3
72
3
72
3
72
3
N
o
te
s.
E
st
im
a
te
d
d
is
co
n
ti
n
u
it
ie
s
o
f
to
w
n
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
a
t
th
e
th
re
sh
o
ld
o
f
ze
ro
m
a
rg
in
o
f
v
ic
to
ry
.
R
D
D
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
sp
li
t
p
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
o
f
M
a
rg
in
o
f
V
ic
to
ry
o
f
th
e
fe
m
a
le
ca
n
d
id
a
te
.
T
w
o
-c
a
n
d
id
a
te
m
ix
ed
ge
n
d
er
ra
ce
s
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
d
er
s
o
n
ly
tw
o
-c
a
n
d
id
a
te
s
ra
ce
s
w
h
er
e
o
n
e
ca
n
d
id
a
te
is
fe
m
a
le
a
n
d
th
e
o
th
er
is
m
a
le
.
In
P
a
n
el
A
th
e
le
ft
-h
a
n
d
si
d
e
va
ri
a
bl
es
a
re
fi
ve
B
ra
zi
li
a
n
m
a
cr
o
-r
eg
io
n
s:
N
o
rt
h
,
N
o
rt
h
ea
st
,
C
en
te
r,
S
o
u
th
,
a
n
d
S
o
u
th
ea
st
.
P
a
n
el
B
th
e
le
ft
-h
a
n
d
si
d
e
va
ri
a
bl
es
a
re
p
re
-d
et
er
m
in
ed
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
l
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:
L
it
er
a
cy
ra
te
is
th
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
pe
o
p
le
a
bo
ve
a
ge
2
0
w
h
o
a
re
li
te
ra
te
.
E
le
ct
ri
ci
ty
is
th
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
h
o
u
se
s
w
it
h
a
cc
es
s
to
el
ec
tr
ic
it
y
.
W
a
te
r
is
th
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
h
o
u
se
s
li
n
ke
d
to
th
e
w
a
te
r
sy
st
em
.
U
rb
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
is
th
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
pe
o
p
le
li
vi
n
g
in
u
rb
a
n
a
re
a
s.
In
co
m
e
re
fe
rs
to
m
o
n
th
ly
pe
r-
ca
p
it
a
in
co
m
e
in
2
0
0
0
a
n
d
is
m
ea
su
re
d
in
B
ra
zi
li
a
n
re
a
is
.
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
n
u
m
be
r
o
f
in
h
a
bi
ta
n
ts
.
S
ew
er
is
th
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
h
o
u
se
s
li
n
ke
d
to
th
e
se
w
er
a
ge
sy
st
em
.
R
a
d
io
eq
u
a
ls
o
n
e
if
th
er
e
is
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e
lo
ca
l
ra
d
io
st
a
ti
o
n
in
th
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
.
A
bs
en
te
ei
sm
is
th
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
vo
te
rs
th
a
t
fa
il
u
re
to
a
p
pe
a
r
in
th
e
el
ec
ti
o
n
d
a
y
.
G
en
d
er
w
a
ge
ga
p
is
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
ge
n
d
er
sa
la
ry
ga
p
,
se
e
pa
pe
r
fo
r
d
et
a
il
s
a
bo
u
t
th
e
es
ti
m
a
ti
o
n
o
f
th
is
va
ri
a
bl
e.
P
a
n
el
C
th
e
le
ft
-h
a
n
d
si
d
e
va
ri
a
bl
es
a
re
m
a
y
o
ra
l
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
:
P
S
D
B
,
D
E
M
,
P
M
D
B
,
P
T
is
th
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
es
w
h
er
e
th
e
m
a
y
o
r
is
a
ffi
li
a
te
d
w
it
h
P
S
D
B
,
D
E
M
,
P
M
D
B
,
a
n
d
P
T
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.P
re
si
d
en
t’
s
co
a
li
ti
o
n
is
th
e
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
es
th
e
m
a
y
o
r
is
a
ffi
li
a
te
d
to
o
n
e
o
f
th
e
p
re
si
d
en
t’
s
co
a
li
ti
o
n
pa
rt
y
.
P
ri
m
a
ry
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
is
eq
u
a
l
to
1
if
th
e
m
a
y
o
r
h
a
s
a
t
m
o
st
a
n
el
em
en
ta
ry
sc
h
oo
l
d
eg
re
e.
H
ig
h
S
ch
oo
l
is
eq
u
a
l
to
1
if
th
e
m
a
y
o
r
h
a
s
a
t
le
a
st
h
ig
h
sc
h
oo
l
d
eg
re
e.
M
a
rr
ie
d
is
eq
u
a
l
to
1
if
th
e
m
a
y
o
r
is
m
a
rr
ie
d
.
A
ge
is
th
e
a
ge
o
f
th
e
ca
n
d
id
a
te
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
in
y
ea
rs
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
2
0
0
8
el
ec
ti
o
n
s.
C
o
ll
eg
e
is
eq
u
a
l
to
1
if
th
e
m
a
y
o
r
h
a
s
a
t
le
a
st
co
ll
eg
e
d
eg
re
e.
P
o
li
ti
ci
a
n
is
eq
u
a
l
to
1
if
th
e
m
a
y
o
r
h
a
s
p
re
vi
o
u
s
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
in
po
li
ti
cs
.
R
o
bu
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
le
ve
l
a
re
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
ve
l
is
re
p
re
se
n
te
d
by
*
,
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
ve
l
by
*
*
,
a
n
d
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
ve
l
by
*
*
*
.
37
T
ab
le
5:
T
h
e
Im
p
ac
t
of
G
en
d
er
on
O
u
tc
om
es
,
R
D
D
E
st
im
at
es
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
P
an
el
A
N
on
N
on
N
o
T
ot
al
D
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
di
sc
re
ti
on
ar
y
pr
e-
na
ta
l
pr
e-
m
at
ur
e
C
or
ru
pt
io
n
tr
an
sf
er
s
tr
an
sf
er
s
tr
an
sf
er
s
vi
si
ts
bi
rt
hs
O
L
S
0.
15
5
0.
28
6*
**
-0
.1
31
*
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
-0
.0
57
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
07
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
03
)
(0
.0
64
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
42
5
2,
42
5
2,
42
5
2,
89
4
2,
89
4
16
1
Sp
lin
e
po
ly
no
m
ia
l
0.
73
3*
**
0.
83
5*
**
-0
.1
02
-0
.0
16
**
0.
01
2*
*
-0
.3
38
**
(0
.2
27
)
(0
.2
39
)
(0
.1
47
)
(0
.0
07
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.1
59
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
2,
42
5
2,
42
5
2,
42
5
2,
89
4
2,
89
4
16
1
L
oc
al
lin
ea
r
re
gr
es
si
on
0.
84
0*
**
1.
08
0*
**
0.
01
9
-0
.0
13
*
0.
01
2*
*
-0
.2
82
**
(0
.2
40
)
(0
.2
67
)
(0
.1
31
)
(0
.0
08
)
(0
.0
06
)
(0
.1
41
)
O
pt
im
al
h
14
12
19
11
16
17
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
1,
34
9
1,
20
4
1,
66
1
1,
36
6
1,
77
8
11
0
P
an
el
B
T
em
po
ra
ry
P
er
m
an
en
t
R
e-
el
ec
ti
on
R
e-
ru
n
pu
bl
ic
pu
bl
ic
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
O
L
S
-0
.0
08
-0
.0
71
-0
.0
91
**
-0
.0
35
(0
.1
73
)
(0
.2
01
)
(0
.0
43
)
(0
.0
45
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
76
4
76
4
49
3
49
3
Sp
lin
e
po
ly
no
m
ia
l
-0
.7
90
*
-0
.2
69
-0
.2
14
**
0.
04
5
(0
.4
44
)
(0
.5
58
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.1
16
)
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
76
4
76
4
49
3
49
3
L
oc
al
lin
ea
r
re
gr
es
si
on
-0
.7
77
*
-0
.0
48
-0
.1
85
*
0.
15
3
(0
.4
39
)
(0
.5
48
)
(0
.1
01
)
(0
.1
27
)
O
pt
im
al
h
13
13
14
11
O
bs
er
va
ti
on
s
42
0
42
0
29
7
25
2
N
o
te
s.
R
es
u
lt
s
a
re
d
is
p
la
y
ed
fo
r
O
L
S
,
R
D
D
3
r
d
o
rd
er
sp
li
n
e
p
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
a
n
d
lo
ca
l
li
n
ea
r
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
w
it
h
o
p
ti
m
a
l
b
a
n
d
w
id
th
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
in
C
a
lo
n
ic
o
,
C
a
tt
a
n
eo
a
n
d
T
it
iu
n
ik
(2
0
1
2
).
R
D
D
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
o
n
s
w
it
h
sp
li
t
p
o
ly
n
o
m
ia
l
a
n
d
lo
ca
l
li
n
ea
r
re
g
re
ss
io
n
a
s
in
eq
u
a
ti
o
n
(4
)
a
n
d
(5
),
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
in
P
a
n
el
A
:
T
o
ta
l
in
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
tr
a
n
sf
er
s,
D
is
cr
et
io
n
a
ry
in
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
tr
a
n
sf
er
s
a
n
d
N
o
n
d
is
cr
et
io
n
a
ry
in
fr
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
tr
a
n
sf
er
s
a
re
y
ea
rl
y
tr
a
n
sf
er
s
fr
o
m
th
e
fe
d
er
a
l
g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t
to
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
es
(p
er
-c
a
p
it
a
re
a
l
v
a
lu
es
in
2
0
0
0
B
ra
zi
li
a
n
re
a
is
).
N
o
p
re
-n
a
ta
l
v
is
it
s
is
th
e
y
ea
rl
y
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
p
re
g
n
a
n
t
w
o
m
en
w
it
h
o
u
t
a
n
y
p
re
-n
a
ta
l
v
is
it
b
ef
o
re
th
e
d
el
iv
er
y.
N
o
p
re
-m
a
tu
re
b
ir
th
s
is
th
e
y
ea
rl
y
fr
a
ct
io
n
o
f
b
ir
th
s
th
a
t
a
re
n
o
t
p
re
-m
a
tu
re
.
C
h
a
rg
es
o
f
co
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
eq
u
a
ls
o
n
e
if
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e
ep
is
o
d
e
o
f
co
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
.
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
in
P
a
n
el
B
:
P
er
m
a
n
en
t
p
u
bl
ic
em
p
lo
y
ee
is
th
e
lo
g
o
f
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
er
m
a
n
en
t
p
u
b
li
c
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
h
ir
ed
to
w
o
rk
d
ir
ec
tl
y
in
th
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
l
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
.
T
em
po
ra
ry
p
u
bl
ic
em
p
lo
y
ee
is
th
e
lo
g
o
f
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
te
m
p
o
ra
ry
p
u
b
li
c
em
p
lo
y
ee
s
h
ir
ed
to
w
o
rk
d
ir
ec
tl
y
in
th
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
l
a
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
o
n
.
R
e-
el
ec
ti
o
n
is
eq
u
a
l
to
1
if
th
e
in
cu
m
b
en
t
m
a
y
o
r
is
re
el
ec
te
d
.
R
e-
ru
n
is
eq
u
a
l
to
1
if
th
e
in
cu
m
b
en
t
m
a
y
o
r
re
-r
u
n
th
e
su
b
se
q
u
en
t
el
ec
ti
o
n
.
T
h
e
la
st
tw
o
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
d
efi
n
ed
fo
r
m
a
y
o
rs
w
h
o
a
re
el
ig
ib
le
to
ru
n
fo
r
re
-e
le
ct
io
n
.
T
w
o
-c
a
n
d
id
a
te
m
ix
ed
ge
n
d
er
ra
ce
s
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
d
er
s
o
n
ly
tw
o
-c
a
n
d
id
a
te
s
ra
ce
s
w
h
er
e
o
n
e
ca
n
d
id
a
te
is
fe
m
a
le
a
n
d
th
e
o
th
er
is
m
a
le
.
h
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
in
te
rv
a
l
o
f
o
u
r
ru
n
n
in
g
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
F
o
r
in
st
a
n
ce
h
=
1
0
re
p
re
se
n
ts
m
ix
ed
g
en
d
er
ra
ce
s
w
h
er
e
m
a
rg
in
o
f
v
ic
to
ry
is
b
et
w
ee
n
-1
0
%
a
n
d
1
0
%
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
le
v
el
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
v
el
is
re
p
re
se
n
te
d
b
y
*
,
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
v
el
b
y
*
*
,
a
n
d
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
v
el
b
y
*
*
*
.
38
Table 6: The Impact of Gender on Health Outcomes by Education Category, RDD Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Illiterate Semi- Primary Secondary
illiterate education education
Panel A: No pre-natal visits
OLS -0.012* -0.002 -0.025** -0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 2,894 2,894 2,894 2,894
Spline Polinomial -0.032* -0.025** 0.002 0.001
(0.016) (0.010) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 2,894 2,894 2,894 2,894
Local linear regression -0.026 0.015 -0.004 0.002
(0.019) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
Optimal h 12 12 14 14
Observations 1,450 1,450 1,614 1,614
Panel B: No pre-mature births
OLS 0.004 -0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 2,894 2,894 2,894 2,894
Spline Polinomial -0.001 -0.001 0.009 0.008
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 2,894 2,894 2,894 2,894
Local linear regression 0.018* -0.004 0.004 0.011
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.012)
Optimal h 22 15 21 14
Observations 2,138 1,706 2,070 1,614
Notes. Results are displayed for OLS, RDD 3rd order spline polynomial and local linear regressions
with optimal bandwidth calculated as in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2012). RDD specifications
with split polynomial and local linear regression as in equation (4) and (5), respectively. Panel A
report the results when no pre-natal visits is the dependent variable. Panel B report the results
when no pre-mature birth is the dependent variable. No pre-natal visits is the yearly fraction of
pregnant women without any pre-natal visit before the delivery. No pre-mature births is the yearly
fraction of births that are not pre-mature. In column 1, Illiterate is the fraction of illiterate women
with no pre-mature births or non pre-natal visits; in column2, semi-Illiterate is the fraction of semi-
illiterate women with no pre-mature births or no pre-natal visits; In column 3, Primary education
is the fraction of women with at most primary education and with no pre-mature births or with no
pre-natal visits; in column 4, Secondary education is the fraction of women with at most secondary
education and with no pre-mature births or no pre-natal visits, respectively. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented
by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 7: The Impact of Gender on Discretionary Infrastructure Transfers, Pre-natal Visits
and Temporary Public Employment, Heterogeneity Results
Discretionary No pre-natal Temporary
infrastructure visits public
transfers employment
Panel A
First-term 0.704*** -0.006 -1.158***
(0.236) (0.005) (0.423)
Second-term 0.767*** -0.019*** 0.519
(0.062) (0.000) (0.360)
Difference 0.063 -0.013* 1.677**
(0.424) (0.008) (0.949)
Observations 2,425 2,894 764
Panel B
First 2-years 0.775*** -0.017*** -0.287
(0.278) (0.006) (0.532)
Last 2-years 0.810*** -0.012*** -1.292***
(0.030) (0.001) (0.136)
Difference 0.036 0.004 -1.005
(0.371) (0.007) (0.746)
Observations 2,425 2,894 764
Notes. Results are displayed for RRD 3rd-order spline polynomial specification in different subsamples, as especfied in equation
(6). In Panel A the heterogeneity dimension Dit is a dummy variable that denotes whether the mayor is on her second-term,
where the mayor face a binding term limit. In panel B the heterogeneity dimension Dit is a dummy variable that denotes the
last two years of the municipal mandate and zero in the first two years. Discretionary infrastructure transfers yearly amount
of discretionary transfers from the federal government to municipalities (per-capita real values in 2000 Brazilian reais). No pre-
natal visits is the yearly fraction of pregnant women without any pre-natal visit before the delivery Temporary public employee
is the log of number of public employees hired to work directly in the municipal administration. Two-candidate mixed gender
races sample considers only two-candidates races where one candidate is female and the other is male. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **,
and at the 1% level by ***.
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Appendix (For Online Publication)
This Appendix provides additional robustness checks, which are also discussed in the paper.
In particular, we present the following robustness checks:
• T-test of the outcomes in close elections with different intervals of margin of victory of
the female candidate (Table A1);
• Test of the continuity of the density for different sub-samples (Figure A1);
• Placebo tests based on permutation methods (Figure A2).
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Figure A1: McCrary Test for Other Mixed Gender Races Samples
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Notes. Weighted kernel estimation of the log density of the running variable (Margin of
Victory of the female candidate) performed separately on either side of the zero Margin of
Victory threshold. MVit > 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t
is female, MVit < 0 when the winner candidate in the municipality i and mandate t is male.
Optimal bin-width and bin-size as in McCrary (2008). We are presenting the tests for the
following mixed races samples: left panel considers all races where the two first candidates
are a man and a woman (discontinuity estimate: point estimate -0.095 and standard error
(0.054)), right panel considers all races where in the first three candidates there are at least
one man and one woman (discontinuity estimate: point estimate -0.094 and standard error
(0.054)). All samples consider 2000 and 2004 municipal elections.
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Figure A2: Placebo Tests for Outcomes
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Notes. The figure reports the empirical c.d.f. of the t-statistics from a set of rdd estimations
at 580 false thresholds below and above the true threshold at Margin of Victor of the female
candidate equal zero (namely, t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of victory
from -30% to -1% as fake cutoffs and t-statistics from regressions that consider margin of
victory from 1% to 30% as fake cutoffs).
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